The ninth treatise of Plotinus's second Ennead is devoted to a critique of the Gnostics and is titled Against Those Who Affirm the Creator of the Cosmos and the Cosmos Itself to Be Evil. In it Plotinus refutes the following propositions of the Gnostics: that the sensible world is formless and bad; that the creator of this world is evil; that the world was created and will eventually perish; that the original cause of the creation of the world was the (...) fall of one of the divine hypostases—Sophia or the World Soul; that there are more than three divine hypostases; that the individual soul of the human person chosen for salvation is the sole spark of divine fire in this world; and that direct comprehension of the supreme deity and reunification with it are accessible to such a chosen soul and to it alone. (shrink)

Much attention is given to education in philosophy in the USSR, in which the study of dialectical and historical materialism occupies a special place. The practical achievements involved in the transformation of society, together with the advance of the natural and social sciences, have demonstrated most clearly the great strength of dialectical materialism as the scientific world view of the working people and as the philosophical foundation of their practical activity. It is therefore no accident that philosophy has an immense (...) attraction for people in our country. (shrink)

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo] , along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

As it happened, I became acquainted with E.V. Il'enkov quite late, in the mid- or even the late 1960s. It was only a bit more than ten years before his death that I began to feel at home in his house, was able to visit without calling ahead, and was able to call him by his first name and the familiar "you"—that is, like many, many of not only his true friends but also like-minded thinkers, who became his close acquaintances, (...) most of whom justly considered themselves his pupils … The door would open wide, and Olia, Professor K.I. Salimova, Eval'd's wife and most devoted friend, not at all surprised by the unexpected guest and seemingly even quite happy at his arrival , would try first to draw him into the kitchen and feed him … which she more often than not succeeded in doing. I am not talking about myself: there were always many guests, and this is precisely how they arrived at the Il'enkovs' apartment. Recently, a critic in Literaturnaia gazeta recalled those whom he met in Eval'd's apartment in the 1960s: "This was a tight circle of like-minded thinkers," wrote the critic. "But some of them are no longer with us, while most are far away, beyond our borders." Obviously, he had not been in the house often or had forgotten things over the distance of years. There was no "circle," nor could there have been one—not with this host, not with his lifestyle and way of relating to people. I met a good hundred fine and various people in Eval'd's home: I.N. Korzhavin, V. Davydov, A. Meshcheriakov, S. Vinogradova, N. Dubinin, V. Zinchenko, A. Zinov'ev, Iu. Kamiakin, and … indeed, five pages would not be enough to list the quite famous and the not-quite-so-famous, simply ordinary people with no claim to fame. Nazym Khikmet, A.N. Leont'ev, and B.M. Kedrov were friends of the house … Ever new faces, figures, and words come to mind. I cannot forgive myself: once Eval'd Vasil'evich wanted to take me along to Iurii Liubimov's to read his play Neither God nor Tsar nor Hero … [Ni bog, ni tsar' i ni geroi], but I had some other business, something so important that I do not even remember now what it was, and it is probably not worth remembering. But most likely I was too timid to appear uninvited at the house of a person burning with creativity. The same thing happened with Galich … Eval'd liked especially his song about Zoshchenko. He did not sing it; he narrated it, but in such a way that tears always came to one's eyes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAttentional bias to uncertain threat is associated with anxiety disorders. Here we examine the extent to which emotional face distractors and individual differences in intolerance of uncertainty, impact saccades in two versions of the “follow a cross” task. In both versions of the follow the cross task, the probability of receiving an emotional face distractor was 66.7%. To increase perceived uncertainty regarding the location of the face distractors, in one of the tasks additional non-predictive cues were presented before the onset (...) of the face distractors and target. We did not find IU to impact saccades towards non-cued face distractors. However, we found IU, over Trait Anxiety, to impact saccades towards non-predictive cueing of face distractors. Under these conditions, IU individuals’ eyes were pulled towards angry face distractors and away from happy face distractors overall, and the speed of this deviation of the eyes was determined by the combination of the c... (shrink)

Rumors were afoot at the Sixth Comintern Congress that there were political differences between Bukharin and Stalin. Except for Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's comments on the Comintern Theses, other Chinese delegates seem to have expressed no public disagreement with Bukharin. The following speech, made by one "Tschang-Bio" (Chang Kuo-t'ao?) at the fourteenth session, may serve to illustrate this tactful attitude.

1. Tŭrŏ kanŭn kŭl -- 2. Chungguk ŭi Pulgyo suyong : Yu, Pul kan ŭi kyosŏp kwa taerip -- 3. Koryŏ mal Yu, Pul taerip ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch'ui -- 4. Chosŏn ch'ogi paebul sasang kwa Pulgyo ŭi taeŭng -- 5. Yŏmal sŏnch'o Yu, Pul ch'ŏrhak nonjaeng ŭi t'ŭkching kwa ŭiŭi -- 6. Naganŭn kŭl.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE UNITY OF THE VICES JONATHAN JACOBS Oolgate University, Hamilton, New York JOHN ZEIS Oanisius Ooilege, Buffalo, New York W:E SOMETIMES describe someone 1rus "just plain,, ' ' • • 0 " ' ' • • mean, or Just plam d1shonesit, orr JUSt pJam unw." Or we say" thaJt wrus ·a just plain ·stupid thing rto do.," G~a:liizing from tlhese and lik!e descriiptions, we can ask, are there any (...) "just plain" vices? By this I mean, are :amy vices pure, 1e.g., can rthere he Cl'lllelty hut nort injustice or in!t:Jempertance, intemperance hut no!t a £ailill'e orf pmctical wisdom, cowardice but not intemperance or injustice, and so on? Is therie perhaps a unity of the vices? Is each ;a col'l'IU!ption thrat involves the coITUpiting ctontriburtion of the othe'l'IS? If there is,a, run:iity of the vicies, then 1be:inig ra vicious individual is Il!Ort siinply 1a ma!bter o:f failing :across the dimensioill of one or rrunothe.r 1 Cihaa:iae1becisltic. ]t ms tan extensi,ve diaiilure, 1a unified (:if l[JIOrt toit.al) failure, even if it is most evident 1and preVialent in one or another •specific respecit. 'f1his iis not to isay thrut.theiie is just one vice,.any moil'!e 1than '!Jo.endorse the unity of it.he virtues is to reduce tth:em to Ollle. There.are many woes OOlld many virrbues, eaiCh respeotively h!ruving to do with dillemnt 1and variously!l'le1aibed crupacirties, motives, emotions, and tiiaiits. Yet, rut least with respect to the virtues a good caise can be mrude :that they.are unified, aind thrut ·AnisbotLe was oorrreot in concluding that practical wisdom :and viWtues of cha;riacter mum occur st quite 1 s1tably, even if '1llolt happily. In any case, we ail"e in 1 to:tal ag.rteemelllt with Geach when he 1sayis 1that ithaJt "If 1a man's ha1bit of sound moml judgme1J11t is virtiiafod anyiwhere, then :it is at risk eVierywhere; but not all dangel"s issue in disa1sit1e'f!s." 3 But 1thes1e dis1as!ters arie aV1eTted r.not because of,any moml str1ength of characil:er 1 th:ait the agent 1truly ihas bUJt heca:us1 e of a me11e inc1ilJJaition tues. 'Ilhe former may he very :firm ox srtable. Mo11eover the n:aituil'ally vi11tuous rindividual may giener1a1ly no1t he oornfused or.impeded maction by "b.ar:d easies" or nnvelty. Alt times he rmay, 1and lthien me may find his re1sourroes iinoompe1be!I1t O'I.' unoel 'l:Ja1in in 1bhreir direetives. Hut the main rpo:inlt of co111iCT'last is thait mo11al virtues 11eflieot 1a 1evel of 1agency wh1oh involves undersitanding 1and self-determin1ation engiaged 1 to t:hat undersltanding, 1a 1leviel tihJait tis 1ruhsen1t foom iinc1ination-grounded action. Na,tu11a1l vri:r1tues 1a1rie ll101t to he despised, 1 and 1aclts :thait fLorw 1f110m 1tJhem 1are not w:iithout moml Wiortlh. But, using the fangiuiage of Fr1a:nk£u:rt, mom1l virtues are oha1racter]s,tios thait refiecrt second order volitions.5 The aiotis: thait flow fil1om them •are not H11e reis:ult of ways one just hrupens to be. And the undeil'-,starnding involvred in moml vrntues makes mo'ral misdireotion 1 1es;s li1"ely. Again, mnswder suoh t.lrings rus mis1applied oomprussfon, or paiti:errce, whioh can involve u1mairness 1and imprudence. P1 errharpis it.is heoausie rbhe mo:rial V1mtueis rare unified that it is 1so hard to rbe 1good. They invo1vie a complex reperrto:We of judgmenits, d1sposi!tiorrs, and moti¥es. No one of them can he oomp1ete on its own, and wie c1an't oome to have 1 tJhem simply 1hy decis1on. One oan til.'y rbo he move coumgeous bU1t caill't ibring it rubout meriely hy init1emal eommanid. Self-imposrutiion in5 In " Freedom of the Will and 'The Concept of a Person," H. Frankfurt writes, "Someone has a desire of the second order when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires "secondorder volitions" or " volitions of the second order." Now it is having... (shrink)

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik. (shrink)

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when (...) the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties. (shrink)

Nondualism, ontology, and anthropology -- Anthropology and the synthetic a priori: Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty -- Blind faith and the binding of Isaac: the Akedah -- Excursus I: sacrifice as human existence -- Counter-sacrifice and instrumental reason: the Holocaust -- Bourdieu's anti-dualism and "generalized materialism" -- Habermas's anti-dualism and "communicative rationality" -- Technological efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Epistemic efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Contradiction and choice among the Dinka and in Genesis -- Contradiction in Azande oracular practice and (...) in psychotherapeutic interaction -- Epistemic and ethical gain -- Transcending dualism and amplifying choice -- Excursus II: what good, ethics? -- Anthropology and the generative primacy of moral order -- Conclusion: Emancipatory selfhood and value-rationality. (shrink)

Criticises the reduction of rightness and wrongness to the emotional reaction of an impartial observer to actions.

Study of Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa, work on the fundamentals of Sankhya philosophy.

IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SUPPOSED that Aristotle's account of thought and action imposes severe limits on the functions and scope of practical reason; and insofar as Thomas Aquinas accepts Aristotle's account, he seems to be forced into the same restrictive view of practical reason. Practical reason expresses itself primarily in deliberation ; and the virtue that uses practical reason correctly is the deliberative virtue of prudence. Aristotle believes that deliberation is confined to means to ends, while will is focused on (...) ends. Some ends that are assumed on some occasions may on other occasions also count as means to more ultimate ends; but it seems that the most ultimate ends must be taken for granted in any deliberation. Since every deliberation must take for granted some end to which the deliberation finds means, the conclusions of rational deliberation must ultimately be about means to ultimate ends that are not themselves subject to practical reason. (shrink)